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ABSTRACT: Starting from two case studies, the Belep Islands (New Caledonia) and Futuna 
(Wallis and Futuna), this essay presents the hypothesis that colonial and post-colonial 
dynamics tend to reproduce, as in fractals, the centre-periphery model. In the ‘Francophone 
Pacific’ inter-island relationships have historically been created in which the peripheral islands 
of islands claim their autonomy and, at times, their total independence from the central island. 
This is the case for Futuna, a peripheral Polynesian island that claims autonomy from Wallis. 
It is also the case for Belep, in the extreme north of New Caledonia, which suffers from 
persistent marginality with regard to the Grande Terre. Decolonisation of Futuna and Belep 
seems possible at the cost of dismantling the centre-periphery fractal model. These islands of 
islands show us how the reticular model, the enhancement of relationships and reciprocity, 
and the recovery of their complexity are a possible way out of colonialism. 
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An anthropology of European overseas islands and territories? 
 
Drawing upon the ‘island sovereignty’ approach recently proposed by Gerard Prinsen and 
Séverine Blaise (2017), the present article develops a critique of the centre-periphery fractal 
model for non-self-governing islands. We understand non-self-governing islands as island and 
archipelagic territories that are geographically and culturally distant from their metropoles and 
connected to them by persistent relations imposed on them during imperial colonial times. 
Our approach echoes Prinsen and Blaise (2017, p. 57) in showing that the “islands are not 
rejecting change: they are rather active in changing that relationship [with the colonial 
metropole] and they are quite successful in doing so on their own terms.” The processes 
leading to autonomy that we will here discuss are of an active, creative character and model 
new political and social forms (Favole, 2010). 
Our article seeks specifically to underline that even within certain non-self-governing 
islands and archipelagos, there are islands, such as Futuna and Belep, that are actively 
negotiating relations with their central island (Wallis and Grande Terre respectively), seen 
locally as a centre from which to take distance. These are thus islands of islands, aspiring to 
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shed the condition of being a hyper-periphery, being able to choose their own relations in 
autonomy, be it with other islands, other territories, or mainlands. The result, as in the case 
of Futuna, is a revindication of the peripheral island’s autonomy from the central island and 
the maintenance, creation, or strengthening of a strong connection to the (distant) metropole.  
Prinsen and Blaise (2017) set forth five mechanisms as typical characteristics of ‘islandian 
sovereignty’: (1) islands vote ‘no’ in independence referendums; (2) islands continuously 
negotiate constitutional exceptions; (3) islands get away with bending their metropoles’ law 
or regulations; (4) islands manage public budgets whose shortfall in domestic revenues are 
complemented by significant financial transfers from the metropole; (5) islands can sign 
international treaties or agreements beneficial to them but uncomfortable for their metropole 
and/contrary to its interests. To these, we wish to add a sixth, the coherence of which must 
be verified through further comparative surveys. What we suggest is (6) the existence or 
aspiration to create reticular or archipelagic systems through the creation of migrant 
communities and through the activation of exchange networks that include other islands or 
areas, which can be near or not so near. 
Our approach underlines the importance of local forms of leadership and socio-political 
organisation. As cultural anthropologists, we agree with Zachary Androus and Neyooxet 
Greymorning’s (2016, p. 447) critique of sub-national island jurisdiction (SNIJ) literature that 
focuses “on economic factors to the exclusion of social, cultural and political aspects.” In the 
Belep Islands, for example, we are dealing with a chefferie (chiefdom) founded in the middle 
of the 16th century. During the 19th century, this was transformed in accordance with the 
will of one of its teamaa (chief), with the influence of Catholic missionaries and under colonial 
administration. Restructured again in 2005, when the 21st teamaa was installed, it mirrors the 
present-day needs of Belema society, reintroducing complex ritual and political connections 
within and without the Belep Islands. The creativity that can be seen in the polyarchy of 
Futuna results from the island’s position between two ancient Polynesian chiefdoms (still 
vibrant today), a Catholic mission, and recent French institutions. At the same time, the ‘gift’ 
and ‘redistribution’ economy has given these islands a creative form of local welfare state 
(Favole, 2008) in which the persistent subsistence economy based on horticulture coexists 
with the transfer of conspicuous funds from the metropole, initiating new ‘articulations’ 
(Clifford, 2001). We believe that the way in which local socio-political dynamics shape global 
and international currents that pass through these islands is of utmost importance. Our 
experience with participant observation and long-term and repeated fieldwork has led to us 
acknowledging the complexity of each individual case, which highlights the risk of using 
‘universal’ economic and political indicators without a continuous and attentive consideration 
of local contexts. ‘Deep knowledge’ and ‘thick description’ of local cultures (Geertz, 1973) 
are necessary to “create the conditions for a symmetrical anthropology and to make possible 
the idea of knowledge that is both situated and shared” (Saillant et al., 2001, p. 27).    
Within this theoretical and ethnographical framework, we find it particularly interesting 
that Futuna, Belep, and other non-self-governing islands are part of the so-called ‘Overseas 
Europe’, namely those islands and territories linked to individual continental European states, 
which are now (in EU bureaucratic lexicon) known as Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCTs) and Outermost Regions (ORs). Over the past decades, these islands and territories 
have experienced influences not only from their respective metropoles but also from processes 
of European integration and dis-integration. The present paper in fact belongs to a wider 
research project concerning intercultural coexistence and statutory changes in European 
overseas territories, funded by the Department of Culture, Politics and Society at the 
University of Turin.  
Starting from our lengthy field research on ‘Francophone Oceania’ (Futuna and New 
Caledonia) and more recent research carried out by Adriano Favole on Réunion Island, our 
theoretical and ethnographic perspectives now tend towards the development of a 
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comparative anthropological approach to the European ‘overseas countries’. The notion of 
‘overseas’ is obviously quite problematic and loaded with a colonial burden: apart from its 
institutional meaning in the ambit of the individual national sovereignties and the EU, it 
includes a number of islands and territories that are of heterogeneous ethno-cultural 
composition, are located in diverse regions, and have had divergent colonial and postcolonial 
experiences. Nonetheless, we feel that it is precisely the variety of the experiences of 
interethnic conflict and coexistence that make overseas territories an important area of study, 
offering a set of ethnographic examples useful for developing a discourse on the pluralism of 
European citizenship. 
To simplify, we could say that, viewed from these peripheral islands of Europe, the 
notion of ‘overseas’ appears highly ambivalent, ethnocentric, ambiguous, and colonial. The 
prefix ‘over-’ in itself sounds ‘remote’, ‘peripheral’, if not ‘exotic’. Yet it is true that during 
some historical periods there was a certain convergence between these heterogeneous areas. 
We refer, for example, to the considerable resonance of the nationalist uprisings of New 
Caledonia during the 1980s (Ghisoni et al., 1988), to the influence of the créolité ideology in 
the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean in the 1970s (Bernabé et al., 1989), and to the 
movements that have characterised the history of many islands, such as the strong presence of 
the community of Wallis and Futuna in New Caledonia and the tense relationship with local 
Kanak communities. The current exposure of OCTs and ORs to European integration 
policies is a further and unprecedented trait-d’union between the overseas territories, the effects 
of which have thus far been understudied (Adler-Nissen & Gad, 2013). Based on the model 
Wouter Veenendaal (2015) proposes for the Caribbean region, we feel it important to develop 
a comparative analysis of overseas Europe, relative not only to the political dynamics of 
European nations such as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal 
but also to the unprecedented relationship with Brussels and EU institutions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of French-speaking Oceania. (© Adriano Favole, 2010) 
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Futuna: a hyper-periphery of Wallis 
 
Colonial and, more recently, post-colonial politics imposed a ‘fractal model’ upon islands’ 
political and social organisation, one based on a centre-periphery axis. By ‘fractal model’, we 
refer to the replication, at different scales, of the same centre-periphery model of dependence 
that created actual islands-of-islands in many overseas territories. Today, some of these islands-
of-islands are seeking to interrupt these dynamics, claiming autonomy from their central 
islands. Although we focus on the cases of Futuna and Belep, similar circumstances apply or 
have applied in recent history to many non-self-governing islands and small island states (e.g. 
Mayotte and Réunion, Mauritius and Rodriguez, St. Marteen and Curaçao). We take our 
point of departure from an event that Adriano Favole had the opportunity to investigate in 
2006, when the two chiefdoms on the island of Futuna officially asked the French authorities 
for the constitution of a sub-prefecture.  
Futuna is an island in Western Polynesia which, together with Wallis (‘Uvea), form the 
Collectivité d’outre-mer (COM) of Wallis and Futuna (an OCT in EU terminology). Futuna 
currently has a population of approximately 3600 (INSEE, 2013): in the last ten years, there 
has been a considerable drop (18%) in the island’s population due to a low birth rate and an 
intense migratory movement above all towards the Melanesian archipelago of New 
Caledonia. In 2009, over 20,000 natives of Wallis and Futuna were estimated to be living in 
New Caledonia, amounting to 8% of New Caledonia’s population. Inhabited around 2700 
years ago by an Austronesian-speaking people who made Lapita pottery, Futuna was 
‘discovered’ by Dutch explorers in 1616. A stable European presence was only established in 
1837, when Catholic missionaries from the Society of Mary (the Marist Brothers) arrived on 
the island: this event created the link between Wallis and Futuna (Angleviel, 1994). Quite by 
chance, the French missionaries settled on both islands, which soon became a French and 
Catholic enclave in a predominantly Anglophone and Protestant region (Tonga, Samoa, Fiji). 
A French protectorate from 1887 onwards, Futuna became part of the French overseas 
territories in 1961, following a referendum in which the local population voted by a large 
majority (more than 99%) for annexation by France (Roux, 1995). The Wallis and Futuna’s 
political status has undergone no major changes since, unlike two other OCTs in the Pacific, 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia, which have acquired progressively more significant 
forms of autonomy (Lotti, 2010). 
From a political standpoint, Futuna is an island in which traditional institutions (two 
chefferies à titre, the chiefdoms of Sigave and Alo) coexist alongside French-style political 
institutions, resulting in a polyarchy characterised by a plurality of leaders and power centres 
(Favole, 2007). The two local chiefdoms (pule’aga sau in Futunan) are confederations of chiefs 
(aliki), divided into village chiefs (aliki pule kolo) and district chiefs (aliki lasi): the king (Sau) is 
the supreme authority, not in the sense of holding oligarchic and pyramidal power but as the 
‘symbol’ of the chiefdom and the trait-d’union between the various leaders (Favole, 2000). 
The spatial extension of Futuna’s two chiefdoms, each with their own Sau, coincide with the 
administrative districts created by the French and with the two Parishes set up by the Church. 
The two Sau are members of the Territorial Council. The supreme administrative authority 
of the territory is the Prefect (Futuna is the only OCT to have maintained this colonial-era 
post), who nominates his Delegate to Futuna. The Territorial Council is comprised of the 
Prefect, the Prefect’s Delegate, the three Sau (the two kings of Futuna and the Lavelua of 
Wallis), and three members nominated by the Prefect. The Territory also has an Assembly 
consisting of 20 elected councillors (known as les élus), of whom thirteen are from Wallis and 
seven from Futuna (four from Alo and three from Sigave). Futuna is among the Polynesian 
islands to have maintained a traditional system of land management (Favole, 2014; Panoff, 
1970): there is still no land register resembling that in Western countries. 
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Before the arrival of missionaries and before falling under French influence, Futuna 
maintained relations with Samoa, which is traditionally regarded as the place of origin of 
Futuna’s first Sau, who introduced the concept of ‘royalty’ to the island (Burrows, 1936). 
Some families of chiefs say they come from Tuvalu, others from Tokelau, and yet others from 
Wallis. According to some elders who Adriano Favole was able to interview in the mid-1990s, 
in ancient times the people of Futuna often went to fish at Cikobia, an island in Fiji. It is said 
that a migratory wave from Cikobia led to the inhabitation of Tikopia, a Polynesian enclave 
in the Solomon Islands studied by the famous ethnologist Sir Raymond Firth. The peoples of 
Futuna and Tikopia speak two very similar Polynesian dialects, and reconstructions of Patrick 
Kirch (1994) suggest that they at one time shared an analogous ritual agricultural calendar. 
Although it is now difficult to estimate the frequency of the journeys back and forth 
and the intercultural contacts, we can be certain that Futuna was by no means isolated in the 
past. In 1996, when Adriano Favole undertook his first fieldwork on the island, the Futunans 
who had just returned from their first participation at the Festival of Pacific Arts (Apia, Samoa) 
said they were astonished to have ‘discovered’ an island on which a completely 
comprehensible language was spoken. As the French presence increased, however, Futuna 
progressively became peripheral to a new centre, Wallis/’Uvea. The missionaries set up the 
headquarters of the Diocese and the Bishop’s Palace on Wallis. When the Protectorate was 
founded at the end of the 19th century, Wallis had the right to host a French secular 
Commissioner, while the delegation to represent the French institutions (custody of the flag, 
postal service, poll tax collection) was entrusted to the head of the Catholic mission until 
1956. With the creation of the Territory of Wallis and Futuna, the centre-periphery model 
was further strengthened. The Prefect took up residence on Wallis, and all heads of the various 
services (public works, culture, agriculture) lived on Wallis. Futuna was only home to their 
‘delegates’. Holding the majority in the Assembly, the island of Wallis claimed most of the 
funds destined for the territory. The only port capable of receiving large cargo ships is on 
Wallis, while the small port of Leava on Futuna is closed in rough seas. The international 
airport at which large planes can land, the bank, the shopping centres, and the car dealers are 
all based on Wallis. Once linked to Samoa and outside the orbit of the ancient Tongan empire 
(which conquered Wallis, imposing a member of the Tongan royal family as supreme head), 
Futuna is now dependent on the ‘Tonganised’ island of Wallis. Every year, Wallis is the 
destination for hundreds of Futunan children who, when they have completed their middle 
school studies, go to the senior high school and sixth form college on the ‘rival island’ (there 
are no secondary schools on Futuna). 
When returning to Futuna for fieldwork in 2006, Adriano Favole came across a lively 
political discussion that pervaded many discourses of the traditional chiefs and of the élus 
(Favole, 2007). During a recent journey to France in which they had met President Jacques 
Chirac, a delegation of Futunan chiefs had officially asked for the creation of a sub-prefecture 
on the island, receiving the general approval of the President. It was, according to Favole’s 
interlocutors, a first step towards the creation of the Collectivité d’outre-mer of Futuna. The 
sub-prefect, unlike the Delegate of the Prefect, would be nominated directly by Paris, without 
passing through the rival ‘centre’ of Wallis. The difference may appear subtle, but it would 
open up a new scenario, in which supreme administrative authority would be disentangled 
from the rival island. Although this measure, repeatedly announced by the French authorities, 
would never be put into practice, it is a symbol of the widespread intolerance that the 
Futunans show towards the people of Wallis. Generally speaking, Futunans desire the sub-
prefecture in order to claim a direct—rather than mediated—bond with France. 
In common with many other non-self-governing islands (Princen & Blaise, 2017), 
Futuna held a referendum (1959) in which the island (like Wallis) voted by a large majority 
for full annexation by France and access to French citizenship, thus leaving behind the 
Protectorship period. Futuna, referring to the second identification criteria by Prinsen and 
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Blaise as an ‘islandian sovereignty’ trait, also negotiated constitutional exceptions when a 
constitutional change became necessary in order to recognise the status archipelago’s three 
Sau (kings) within the République. Wallis and Futuna also benefit from remarkable exceptions 
to metropolitan laws, such as the public financing of Catholic schools (to which the state has 
granted a monopoly for primary education) and denial of genuine religious plurality. In the 
early 1990s, the two chefferies on Futuna declared the Evangelical religion, introduced to the 
island by a few Futunans returning from university studies in Lyon, as inadmissible. The 
traditional chieftains went so far as to dismiss some nurses from the hospital in Kaleveleve 
who had converted to Evangelicalism. In retaliation, for a number of years, the Evangelicals 
did not participate in the redistributive ceremonies of the katoaga or drink the traditional 
Polynesian beverage (kava), which to this day represent important social activities, with the 
act of sharing being considered a demonstration of loyalty to the traditional leaders.  
On Futuna, as in the ‘paradigm’ explained by Prinsen and Blaise (2017), local authorities 
are constantly negotiating with the metropole, whose financial transfers constitute the entire 
budget of an island that produces no goods for export. It must, however, be noted that 
Futuna’s economy is far from passive and entirely dependent. Horticulture (taro, yam, 
manioc), pig breeding, fishing, the building of traditional homes (fale) with local materials, 
and other economic activities are flourishing and help guarantee life on the island as well as 
grant those who return after time away the possibility of satisfying their basic needs. Futuna 
can in a sense be regarded as following the MIRAB model (Bertram & Watters, 1985), with 
overseas ‘remittances’ possessing a special status in this case due to the importance of 
relationships of exchange and gift giving between those who live on the island and those who 
do not. Gifts of money that migrant communities send to inhabitants of Futuna during 
redistributive ceremonies (kataoga) enter the ample circuits of reciprocity through which the 
people who live on Futuna guarantee maintenance of the land of extended families (kutuga), 
to which migrants can later (often at retirement) return. 
The traditional authorities and the élus on Futuna have encouraged commercial 
agreements with the Fiji and New Zealand on a number of occasions: in 2006, for example 
some Futunans bought cars from New Zealand, refusing to pay the tax that is levied on the 
introduction of non-French goods. The Delegate of the time contested the purchase on the 
basis of safety rules that would stop people driving a right wheel drive car on the island. To 
Prinsen and Blaise’s five criteria we would add, in Futuna’s case, the contestation of the 
centre-periphery dynamic that links the island to its ‘rival’ Wallis. The negotiation of 
autonomy based on a direct link with Paris is reinforced by the conviction that the large 
migrant community living in New Caledonia and the growing community of Futunans living 
in France (above all in Paris and the Côte d’Azur) today form a Futunan ‘archipelago’ that 
can offer assistance in the event of natural calamities (earthquakes and cyclones) and help the 
community that lives permanently on the island. This is in addition to the support Futuna 
receives from the metropole and the conspicuous funding coming from the EU. The 1959 
vote by Futunans to join France was without a doubt prompted in part by the possibility of 
receiving assistance in post-cyclone periods.  
The case of Futuna is symbolic because the fractal centre-periphery model can easily be 
applied on the micro-level as well. The relationship between the island’s two chiefdoms 
(Sigave and Alo) in fact also reproduces the centre-periphery model. As we will see for Belep, 
the missionary presence had a strong influence on Futuna’s dwelling pattern: the nearby island 
Alofi lost its population quickly and is today used exclusively for horticulture. The northern 
coast of Tu’a lost part of its population, too. The population concentrated on the southern 
coast where the mission’s churches and schools were built. The presence of the missionaries 
led to a stabilisation of the borders between the two parts of the island and the ‘doubling’ of 
the royalty (which consisted of the right to nominate a Sau or paramount chief). In fact, ever 
since the missionaries arrived, Alo and Sigave have been two rival halves, battling furiously 
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for the right to nominate the Fakavelikele, the ‘title’ that designates the supreme position on 
the island (Favole, 2000). While the first missionary, Pierre Chanel, initially went to live in 
Alo, it was Sigave that benefitted most from the increasing western presence. The first harbour 
installation was constructed in Leava, and it was in this village of Sigave that the French 
delegation established its headquarters when the Territory was constituted. Nowadays, Leava 
is home to the only hotel on the island, a couple of restaurants, a travel agency, and the port. 
Some islanders describe Sigave using hegemonic concepts such as the ‘modern’ and 
‘developed’, as in which, for example, young people can spend the evening at a discotheque. 
Alo is the ‘traditional’ and somewhat ‘backward’ kingdom, where the chiefs forbid restaurants, 
discotheques, and consumption of alcohol on the weekend. Mass is held at 05:30 at Alo’s 
cathedral but has been moved to more ‘modern’ hours in Sigave. Overall, Alo is the hyper-
periphery of Sigave, of Wallis, of New Caledonia, and of the distant metropole—a sort of 
island of marginality to the nth power! 
 
Belep: a story of isolation  
 
The Belep Islands are an archipelago of small islands situated in the northwest of New 
Caledonia. Belep consists of Art Island (Aar), Pott Island (Phwoc), and smaller islets. The Belep 
Islands represent the extreme northern extension of the Grande Terre (as the central island of 
this Melanesian archipelago is known) and are the most distant destination from the capital 
Nouméa, which is about 500 km away. 
There is only one permanently inhabited site in the Belep Islands, where all services are 
concentrated and where the entire population lives. This is Waala, the village situated in the 
bay of the same name, on the western coast of Art Island. The village is traversed by a 
tarmacked road and has a water supply, electricity, and telephone lines. There is the mayor’s 
office, a post office, a doctor’s surgery, infant and elementary schools, a football pitch, a 
volleyball court, two or three shops, a petrol station, the office of the chefferie (chiefdom), and 
a church. There is a jetty where the catamaran and small merchant ships that link the archipelago 
with the Grande Terre can moor, and a few kilometres away, there is a small airfield. 
The Belep Islands’ soil is ferralitic and thus unsuitable for cultivation. The coasts of Art 
and Pott, the two major islands, are scattered with bays and inlets, called nana pwang in the 
local language (pulu Belep). In the nana pwang, alluvial deposits enrich the reddish soil, making 
possible the horticulture that is so important for oceanic peoples (Barrau, 1956; Gourou, 
1948; Haudricourt, 1962). In the bays stand the mounds in which the yams (Dioscorea sp.) are 
grown. The Kanak societies of New Caledonia are described by André Georges Haudricourt 
as the “civilisations of the yam” (Haudricourt, 1964), which is considered a sacred plant. 
The yam drives Belep’s agricultural calendar, marking the rhythm of work in the fields, 
and consequently determining the presence of the Belema people (the inhabitants of the Belep 
Islands) in the bays. In fact, alongside the fields stand the houses seasonally occupied by families 
in accordance with the production cycle of the crops. In particular, the bays are inhabited 
continuously during the holidays after the school year, while for the rest of the year the 
population remains in Waala village, which in turn empties out during the holidays. 
The village was founded more than 150 years ago as a result of the combination of two 
projects: the political project of Wahoulo Chahup II, an enterprising local chief, and the 
religious project of three French missionaries from the Society of Mary. In 1855, Wahoulo 
Chahup II spent a few months at La Conception, a Catholic mission created that same year 
near Port-de-France, now Nouméa. It was a compulsory staging post for all Marists who 
arrived from France and for over 20 years La Conception was a ‘hatchery’ for missionaries 
and catechists sent to open the majority of the missions in New Caledonia and other French 
colonies in the Pacific (Brou, 1982). Wahoulo insisted with great determination that a group 
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of missionaries accompany him to Aar when he returned at the start of 1856 to become the 
new teâmaa (Dubois, 1985; Lambert, 1855-1875). 
Composed of the word teâ (‘the first-born, the chief’) and the suffix maa, which 
indicates ‘the group’, the term teâmaa is translated into French by the expression of colonial 
origin grand chef (‘big chief’). The chain of command implied by the term grand chef only 
occasionally characterises the figure of the teâmaa, yet the strengthening of the teâmaa’s 
political authority was partly the work of the colonial system and partly due to the enterprise 
of a number of chiefs from the north of New Caledonia, including Wahoulo Chahup II 
himself (Douglas, 1972). 
The chief ordered the Belema to convert to Christianity as proof of acceptance of his 
authority, which he also extended through violence to the island of Phwoc (previously a 
separate political unit from Aar). The plan for political dominance enacted by Wahoulo and 
the Marist missionaries required unification of the population within a single central 
settlement. In fact, at the time, the Belema lived in small communities scattered along the 
coasts—the same sites where seasonal cultivation is located today. 
The bay of Waala, the most sheltered on Aar, was chosen as the site for the mission, and 
the teâmaa transferred the chiefdom’s headquarters (kavebu) there. The teâmaa’s political 
ambitions matched those of the missionaries, who sought to implement a ‘reduction’ on Aar 
(Dubois, 1985), in accordance with the population concentration model of the reducciones 
instituted by the Jesuits centuries earlier in South America, then still considered an exemplar 
of ‘evangelical efficacy’ (Laux, 2000). Bringing the Belema together around the mission 
buildings seemed to be the only way of ensuring that children went to school and that everyone 
took part in catechism and the liturgy. 
The processes of production and distribution of symbolic and material resources were 
likewise centralised, and the teâmaa’s social role and political power were redefined to the 
detriment of complementary figures, such as those of the kawu pwemwa (‘masters of the land’). 
Wahoulo Chahup II, who took the name of Amabili Wahoulo when baptised, did not hesitate 
to destroy objects, buildings, cultivations, and entire settlements to overcome resistance to 
the central settlement. Within a couple of years, all the inhabitants of Aar had abandoned the 
scattered settlements and moved to Waala. 
A few years later, the teâmaa and the missionaries replicated this same population, power, 
and resource concentration scheme on Phwoc, the northernmost island (Gilibert, 2007). 
Nevertheless, in 1874, the Poyama were forced to abandon the ‘reduction’ of Phwoc, and 
after having suffered from periodic epidemics, the island’s inhabitants moved to Waala. A French 
settler took up residence on Phwoc shortly thereafter, and the Belema lost all rights to the 
island a few years later. It was only in 2010 that some clans were able to reclaim their lands. 
Over the past 150 years, the history of the Belep Islands has been characterised by a 
dual process: while the creation of the central settlement facilitated internal centralisation, it 
also produced the progressive marginalisation of the small archipelago relative to the rest of 
New Caledonia. In effect, all the projects for economic development—those attempted by 
the missionaries and those of the colonial administration—depended on the disruption of local 
and regional relationships. The Marist Brothers soon founded a sort of theocracy (Devambez, 
1989), which translated into the strict control exercised by the missionaries over interactions 
with the outside world. They presented themselves as the sole interlocutors of the colonial 
administration and managed relations with the colonists and with the European merchants 
and sailors, who were mainly interested in copra and fishing for sea cucumbers. Moreover, 
the new religious groups redirected the traditional relationships between the Kanak 
communities of northern New Caledonia (Dubois, 1985), leading to the suspension of 
political relations, marriages, and rituals with groups that had converted to Protestantism.   
The reduction in relationships with the outside world led to an increase in Belep’s 
isolation. On other islands, such as the Polynesian islands—including Wallis and Futuna—
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studied by Claire Laux (2000), insularity initially hindered Catholic missionaries’ efforts, but 
as time passed, the situation was reversed in favour of the creation of ‘genuine Catholic 
theocracies’, as some observers designated them, ignoring indigenous agency. In contrast, the 
opposite occurred in Belep, and the characteristics that had initially contributed to the 
mission’s success ultimately became unfavourable. The low population level, which had 
halved since the arrival of the missionaries, together with the distance from the Grande Terre 
and logistic difficulties, forced the Marists to abandon Waala in 1876. Nonetheless, Belep’s 
isolation—precisely what drove the missionaries away—attracted the interest of the colonial 
administration: like the Isle of Pines at the southern tip of New Caledonia, Belep was so great 
a distance from the Grande Terre as to be ideal as a prison colony for ‘undesirables’. 
An initial project to create a prison camp for France’s communards (supporters of the 
Paris Commune) failed swiftly, but the opportunity presented itself once again when the 
Kanak revolted on the Grande Terre in 1878. Over 300 men, women, and children, especially 
from the region of Bourail, were deported to Aar and, in part, to Phwoc. Their arrival forced 
the missionaries to return, not only in an attempt to protect the Belema, now converted to 
Catholicism, from the dangerous influence of the ‘pagan’ rebels, but also in the hope of 
converting the new arrivals by integrating them with the archipelago’s existing inhabitants. 
To this end, the Belema, who had returned to their lands during the missionaries’ absence, 
were once again concentrated in Waala. In 1881, the population, which had suddenly 
increased, seemed condemned to famine due to the lack of land suitable for cultivation. Two 
years later, as soon as they were offered the opportunity to leave Belep, the majority of the 
exiles departed, but those who remained were integrated in the Belema society through 
adoption and marriage. 
In 1892, the island of Aar was requisitioned as the site of a leper colony, destined to 
house the sick from all over New Caledonia (Devambez, 1989). The Belema strongly opposed 
the island’s evacuation, but their efforts were in vain. The leper colony was established, and 
the original population was transferred to Balade, where they lived in poverty for seven years 
(Dubois, 1985). Once again, the distance from the Grande Terre made supplying the island 
too onerous, and in May 1898, the leper colony was closed. Leprosy spread amongst the 
Belema, who immediately returned to the island after the hospital’s closure. 
To return to the fractal model, it may be useful to recall that, at the dawn of its colonial 
history, New Caledonia itself was a penal colony. When not filled with ‘social refuse’ rejected 
by the centre, the colonial administration regarded Belep simply as a collection of islands that 
should be cleared of its population. The colonial government, like the missionaries on many 
occasions, repeatedly sought to remove the Belema from the archipelago: it would be more 
useful and convenient to evacuate these islands than to maintain them since they did not offer 
sufficient resources for independent development along colonially imagined lines (Devambez, 
1989). 
This situation was associated with a paradoxical demographic situation. The periods of 
high mortality, caused by epidemics, were followed by phases of overpopulation, linked to 
sudden increases in the number of inhabitants. The already scarce agricultural areas were 
further reduced by the presence of French settlers, making it difficult to feed the population, 
which although limited, was disproportionate to the yield of an increasingly restricted 
territory. In fact, it was only in the early 1940s that the Belema began to overcome the cycle 
of illness and population decline. It was even necessary to repair the schools, to house the 
increasing number of children, and extend the church, which was finally crowded with 
worshippers (Dubois, 1985). 
The history of reception and exile, complementary dynamics that contributed equally 
to the evolution of the Kanak societies (Naepels, 2013), continued until recent times. In the 
1970s, for example, increasingly bitter conflicts over land rights broke into riots that 
devastated Waala. About 100 young people left Belep to settle on the Grande Terre, 
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particularly in Nouméa. Later, in the 1980s, there was a second wave of violence and another 
considerable departure, with an even greater number of Belema moving to the suburbs of 
Nouméa. The exodus from Belep to New Caledonia’s main city has increased since 1996. 
Today, an allotment on the edge of Nouméa is called Les Jardins de Belep (Belep’s gardens) 
and maintains close social, economic, and political relations with the village of Waala. At a 
ritual level, the centre-periphery logic is reversed, since Waala represents the ritual centre, 
and Nouméa is the periphery. This becomes evident every time a funeral or wedding is 
celebrated in Waala: a delegation sets out from Les Jardins de Belep to reach the village and 
participate through gifts and money gathered by the small community of emigrants. 
Belep continues to be considered by its inhabitants, and described from outside, as 
peripheral, marginalised, and even isolated and backward, above all due to transportation 
difficulties. Once again, however, this is not for geographical reasons alone but is also a result 
of relatively recent historical factors.  
Many Belema men have worked for long periods on merchant ships and big fishing 
boats because even today the Belema are considered good navigators and sailors. Previously, 
first with dugout canoes and later with cutters, propelled by oar and sail, the Belema sailed 
against the currents to Nouméa or to the atolls of Entrecasteaux, over 100 km northwest of 
Phwoc. The men went there, above all in December, to catch sea turtles for ceremonial 
meals, risking a dangerous journey that was never undertaken by just one boat. These 
activities involved crossing the Grand Passage and then navigation in the open ocean, without 
the protection of the coral reef. To return, it was necessary to wait for a favourable wind and 
hope that there was a sufficient supply of drinking water. The final such expedition to the 
island of Surprise occurred in 1991. Today, the sailing boats have been replaced by small 
motor boats, mainly bought by professional fishermen with help from the Northern Province, 
and a similar journey has become impractical because fuel is too expensive for such a long 
voyage. Moreover, the possibility of reaching the Grande Terre is enormously limited. Waala 
and Koumac are linked by plane and catamaran twice a week, but these services are cancelled 
during bad weather. The only way to move (a few) people and (small quantities of) goods is 
thus on small fishing boats, which can only make the trip to the Grande Terre at great risk. 
‘Désenclavement’ (opening up) is the keyword of every political speech expressed in 
Belep or concerning Belep and has quickly entered everyday language. The end of the 
isolation for which everyone longs refers not only to relationships with the other islands of 
New Caledonia but also to the interior of the small archipelago. Above all, it involves an 
attempt to revive ancient connections with ancestral lands, located in the bays of Aar and 
Phwoc, which were weakened by the creation of the central settlement of Waala. 
Collective life in Waala is still organised around the chiefdom and the church: the two 
institutions that created the village continue to support its cohesion and regularly organise 
forms of cooperation between groups. The village is also characterised by a dense and lively 
associative fabric that is undeniably encouraged by proximity. Nevertheless, many Belema 
feel that this close proximity is excessive, at times unbearable. Both young and old dream of 
escape from the overcrowded centre and a return to life in their lands of origin, a desire that 
is fostered by community projects to develop permanent settlements in the cultivated bays 
(Giordana, 2014a, 2014b). 
For many years, Belep was seen as an archipelago lacking resources and with precarious 
ecological equilibrium, attracting the interest of missionaries, colonial administrators, various 
merchants, and a few settlers who sought to set up businesses mainly destined to fail due to 
an insularity that was initially profitable yet increasingly transformed into isolation. The 
population concentration policy, like all colonial projects in Belep, resulted in a reduction of 
relationships. This was partly deliberate, a means of distancing the Belema from ‘negative’ 
influence and possible interference, but the reduction of relationships was also an undesired 
effect of the high mortality rate: the number of people was reduced, the groups were reduced, 
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the islands were reduced, the places and their meanings were reduced (including ancestors 
and non-human inhabitants). During the second half of the 19th century, entire clans in Belep 
disappeared, others were adopted, cultivated lands dwindled, relationships with other societies 
to the north were devastated, and those with Europeans were limited. Later, recognition of 
the economic and ecological precariousness and fragility of the islands and their inhabitants 
led to the abandonment of efforts to ‘develop’ them. 
The missionary and colonial projects failed in their attempts to make Belep self-
sufficient; however, the causes of this failure were not insularity and lack of natural resources 
per se. They were rather the isolation and reduction of the main resource of the Belema: the 
possibility to access others. These islands could never be self-sufficient because no island or 
society ever is. Instead, every island is in relation—in interdependence with—other islands, 
with other lands. 
 
Conclusions: from centre-periphery logic to an archipelago logic 
 
The islands of Futuna and Belep are similar inasmuch as colonisation transformed them into 
peripheries, into islands of islands. Futuna and Belep are now using different methods, 
however, in their efforts to uproot this centre-periphery logic and its dynamics. In Futuna’s 
case, a request for autonomy from the central island Wallis is strongly advanced, with 
Futunans requesting a direct link with the metropole and the EU. In the case of Belep, the 
perception of isolation and the desire to escape it leads to an emphasis on reviving the complex 
relations between islands and their interiors. In both cases, a new configuration is emerging 
or re-emerging: a reticular archipelagic logic counteracts the fractal and colonial centre-
periphery logic. Recent work in island studies has considered archipelagic relationships as an 
alternative to mainland-centric perspectives (Pugh, 2013; Roberts & Stephens, 2017; Stratford 
et al., 2011). Archipelagos are by no means ‘natural’ things but are products of human agency. 
The archipelagic logic is creative and expansive, and thanks to this, relationships grow. The 
islands are then considered to be on the same plane as faraway lands, which can also become 
integral parts of the archipelago. 
Recently, European funds have financed the widening of the runway at Futuna’s airport 
and the installation of solar panels on Alofi, where there is no electrical system and where 
people care for their crops and gardens. The construction of a port at which ships can find 
harbour in bad weather is also planned with European funding. Futuna’s ‘archipelago’ now 
extends to Brussels, New Caledonia (home to a large Futunan community), suburban Paris, 
and towns on the Côte d’Azur. On Futuna, the relationship with the centre-periphery model 
calls for high schools on their territory, a hospital where women can give birth safely (most 
women go to Wallis or Nouméa before giving birth), and direct flights to Fiji (thereby 
avoiding long and expensive transits to Nouméa, via Wallis before being able to take 
intercontinental flights).  
Joël Bonnemaison (1991, p. 119) has argued that Pacific islanders have overcome the 
limits of insularity by developing a reticular organisation of space: “The island is inhabitable 
only to the extent to which it is neither the centre nor the suburb, but the element of a course 
that ‘unites’ it with the world.” A few years later, Epeli Hau'ofa (1993) suggested looking at 
Oceania not as “islands in a distant sea” but as a “sea of islands.” From such a perspective, 
every island becomes an expanding archipelago, “growing bigger everyday” through that 
“world enlargement that is carried out by tens of thousands of ordinary Pacific Islanders right 
across the ocean” (Hau'ofa, 1993, p. 151). 
The words of Bonnemaison recall the chemin (the path), a widely used metaphor for 
relationships and social organisation amongst the Kanak. New Caledonia is traditionally 
traversed by chemins that united groups from the Grande Terre with the various other islands 
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of the archipelago. Even today the Loyalty Islands, the Isle of Pines, and Belep are linked with 
one another and with the central island in this manner through strong ritual relationships. 
Many aspects of the policies of New Caledonia in recent decades have been 
characterised by an attempt to disrupt the fractal centre-periphery logic in various areas, 
internal and external, in order to revive the logic of the chemins and of pluralism. From within, 
this effort was made in particular through the creation of three administrative provinces, 
which were instituted following the Matignon Agreements, with a decree dated 24 July 1989. 
In the Northern Province and Loyalty Islands Province, the majority of the population 
belongs to the Kanak community. The institution of the three provinces balances the 
heterogeneous population distribution (concentrated in the south) and the parallel distribution 
of services, centres of power, and capital, promoting an economic ‘rebalancing’. One of the 
requests from the Kanak community for decolonisation was the creation of a ‘second capital’, 
identified as the city of Koné. The recent installation of a mining industry for the extraction 
of nickel (the country’s main natural resource) in the north, on the Koniambo massif, responds 
to the historical presence of a similar metallurgical plant in the south. This measure also aims 
to disrupt the logic of the ‘centre’, of the concentration of wealth and resources in the 
southern area where Nouméa stands, the ‘ville blanche’ (‘the white city’). 
In terms of relationships with the outside world, the disruption of the centre-periphery 
model occurs through the progressive transfer of state competencies from France to New 
Caledonia, as foreseen by the Nouméa Agreement of 1998. In 2018, there will be a 
referendum in which New Caledonia’s citizens will be called upon to express their opinion 
regarding the transfer of the competences régaliennes: justice, defence, currency, and foreign 
affairs. If the response is affirmative, New Caledonia will become a new sovereign state. Jean-
Marie Tjibaou, a leader of the independence movement, who was assassinated in 1989, 
insisted on interdependencies as the keystone of island sovereignty in Oceania: “Sovereignty 
gives us the right and the power to negotiate the interdependencies. For a small country like 
ours, independence consists of calculating the interdependencies properly” (Tjibaou, 1996, 
p. 179). It is not by chance that the cultural policies advanced in recent years by the Jean-
Marie Tjibaou Cultural Centre—which has become a reference point for the entire region 
of Oceania—insist on reviving relationships at the regional level rather than on Kanak identity 
per se. 
Like Bonnemaison, researchers who are currently working with climate change and 
environmental disasters increasingly emphasise the importance of networks (Barnett & 
Waters, 2016). John Campbell (2009) states that the islands of the Pacific, long considered 
sites of vulnerability, should instead be recognised as places of resilience. The capacity for 
‘survival’ that these societies have shown, for example by developing specific measures to 
contain the natural disasters and their effects, are closely linked to relationality: it is 
relationships that have allowed life on the islands. This is shown by the maintenance of 
nutritional security through agricultural-ecological diversity (Pollock, 2002), which results in 
enhanced biodiversity, increased by exchanges between peoples—a biodiversity of plant 
clones and roots on the move (Haudricourt, 1964; Pollock, 1992). In the words of Campbell 
(2009, p. 85), “Pacific islands, and their inhabitants, are not essentially or inherently 
vulnerable. They were traditionally sites of resilience. Colonialism, development, and 
globalisation have set in place processes by which the resilience has been reduced and 
exposure increased.” 
Centre-periphery logic has made the islands of Oceania much more vulnerable. As a 
result, the decolonisation of Futuna and Belep seems possible through the act of dismantling 
the centre-periphery fractal model. These islands of islands show us how the reticular model, 
the enhancement of relationships and reciprocity, and the recovery of their complexity are 
efficacious against disasters and are a possible way out of colonialism. 
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